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I. Introduction
IN BOTH BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES the external costs of private
land development have, over the past fifteen years, been increasingly
borne by private land developers rather than public agencies. In return
for obtaining permission to develop, they have been willing to contrib-
ute money, land and facilities. Sometimes the transaction is designed to
overcome a sustainable planning objection to development proceeding,
such as where an on-site obligation like car parking is commuted into a
financial contribution enabling the authority to provide equivalent off-
site parking (known in the United States as an "in-lieu" fee and in Brit-
ain as a "commuted obligation"). Or the contribution may overcome a
valid prematurity objection by allowing off-site infrastructure to be pro-
vided earlier than it would be under the public agency's capital pro-
gramme. But there have also been instances when the link between the
contribution offered by the developer (or required by the local author-
ity), and the development being permitted, is stretched so far as to be-
come almost invisible.
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In Britain, all these activities are commonly referred to as "planning
gain," an expression often used carelessly' to encompass all contribu-
tions made by developers to local authorities and other public agencies
in land, buildings, or money, but without distinguishing between those
that legitimately fulfill some planning purpose and those that do not.
Britain lacks any rational system of infrastructure contributions through
which costs may be apportioned between different developers, or be-
tween existing and new residents, on a predetermined basis, so that in
dividually negotiated settlements provide the only solution.
In the United States it has been customary to divide such transactions
into three primary categories (often generally characterised as "paying
for growth' ):3 Exactions, dedications and fees, although each is a de-
scription of the form the deal takes rather than of its legitimacy. An "ex-
action" is a requirement that the developer provide some facility, either
on-site or off-site. A "dedication" involves the voluntary contribution
of land to the local authority, which may be commuted into a fee, partic-
ularly on small scale sites. Under the schemes for "impact fees," now
operated in several states, the developer is charged a fee that is calcu-
lated in accordance with the type, scale and location of the proposed
development and is applied to mitigate its impact on the community. A
1. See, e.g., Department of the Environment Circular 22/1983, which advises:
"Planning gain" is a term which has come to be applied whenever, in connection with
a grant of planning permission, a local planning authority seeks to impose on a devel-
oper an obligation to carry out works not included in the development for which per-
mission has been sought or to make some payment or confer some extraneous right or
benefit in return for permitting the development to take place. As such, it is distinct
from any alterations or modifications which the local planning authority may properly
seek to secure to the development that is the subject of the planning application-such
as changes intended to reduce the scale or intensity of the proposed development, or to
improve its layout or its impact on the local environment. . . . In some cases the de-
veloper may offer some such works or payment in applying for planning permission
or in the course of subsequent negotiations: the advice in this circular is relevant in
those circumstances as well as to cases where the authority seeks to impose such obli-
gations.
Department of the Environment Circular No. 22/1983, 2. However, this approach has
been abandoned in a proposed redrafting of that advice contained in a 1989 Consultation
Paper, which seeks to relinquish the expression "planning gain" altogether. Different
descriptions, such as "community advantages," are sometimes encountered in local
authorities' own development plans.
2. But see WATER ACT 1989, § 79, which now allows the post-privatisation water
companies to levy fixed-rate connection charges in respect of new residential develop-
ment. It is intended to assist funding capital costs in constructing major plants, such as
sewage treatment plants, and is in addition to the requisitioning powers carried through
to the 1989 Act from the WATER ACTS 1945 and 1973, under which developers are enti-
tled, in return for contributing to the cost, to require main water services to be brought to
their sites.
3. See, e.g., 0. DAVIDSON & A. USAGAWA, PAYING FOR GROWTH IN HAWAII:
AN ANALYSIS OF IMPACT FEES AND HoUSING EXACTION (1988).
THE URBAN LAWYER
PAYING FOR GROWTH AND PLANNING GAIN
properly designed fees system attempts to allocate infrastructure costs
equitably between developers in accordance with an adopted schedule
of capital facilities, and to offer a guarantee that the infrastructure will
actually be provided within a specified time, or the fee returned. Some
British local governments have experimented tentatively with similar
arrangements, but against a backcloth of considerable legal uncer-
tainty.4
Two further aspects of contemporary United States practice in some
municipalities also call for mention, because they also fall within what
the British regard as "planning gain." The first is "linkage," under
which developers of high value commercial schemes in downtown loca-
tions are required to contribute to, say, an affordable housing scheme in
the suburbs, on the premise that further commercial property develop-
ment in the city will raise housing prices and drive out poorer would-be
homeowners. The second aspect, often tied in with linkage, is the use of
"conditional zoning," under which a developer may choose either to
develop at the density permitted by the zoning ordinance, or, for a speci-
fied "price," to increase the density. The price may be a linkage pay-
ment or a set-aside of land for some public purpose.
But how far can developers' contributions be taken without becoming
simply an alternative form of local taxation or a price tag attached to the
right to develop? To answer that question, it is necessary to first under-
stand the economic pressures that have led to the present situation.
There are doubtless many reasons for the "developer pays" trend,5 but
three stand out as having overwhelming importance: (1) the growing
economic imbalance between the private and the public sector in land
development in an era of ideological commitment to privatisation, low
taxes and limited government; (2) the possession by local authorities of
broad regulatory powers which have substantial financial implications
for developers but which are often financially neutral in their effects on
the authorities themselves (particularly in Britain, for reasons elabo-
rated upon below); and (3) uncertainty as to the applicable law and pol-
icy.
4. The British Government announced in September 1990, its interest in review-
ing United States experience with impact fees, but no policy or legislative commitment
has yet ensued.
5. The factors contributing to the growth of planning gain in England and Wales
are analysed in Jowell and Grant, Guidelines for Planning Gain?, [1983] J.P.L. 427.
Planning gain is less commonly encountered in Scotland because of the different eco-
nomic conditions of land development, although there is some experience of planning
agreements. See infra note 14.
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II. Local Government Finance
There has been sustained pressure on local government finance in both
countries. In the United States, the ad valorem real property tax, or
rates, together with odd user fees, sales tax, and income tax, has proved
insufficient to make up the shortfall of revenues needed to fund neces-
sary infrastructure; attempts to increase the rate of local taxes have met
with taxpayer revolts. Local residents have objected particularly to pay-
ing through taxation for the infrastructure necessary to accommodate
further unwanted (by them) development in their areas.
The same is true in Britain, where local authorities and (until their
privatisation in 1989) water authorities have endured tight centralised
controls over capital expenditure as part of the Thatcher Government's
pursuit of reductions in the public sector borrowing requirement.
Downward pressure has also been applied to revenue expenditure
through successive measures, including block grant readjustments and
rate capping, and culminating in the community charge (or "poll
tax' ').6 This measure seeks to control local expenditure very tightly, be-
cause marginal expenditure 7 is met in full by adult chargepayers without
any further subsidy from government grant or the national nondomestic
rate. It thus bites sharply on the pockets of adult citizens, and the gov-
ernment expects that ballot box sensitivity will induce local politicians
to keep spending down. But there is no incentive to local politicians un-
der this system to permit new development to occur so as to swell local
revenues. All property tax (the "rates") revenues on commercial prop-
erty are now paid to the central government, and redistributed to all lo-
cal authorities on a per capita basis. Moreover, the allocation of gov-
ernment grants is designed to even out the resource differences between
local authorities. New residential development increases the tax base
for community charge, but also increases the cost of services to be met
from the charge. Thus the financial consequences for the local planning
authority of granting or refusing planning permission are broadly neu-
tral, but the pressure to hold spending down is likely to be tighter in the
6. For a detailed discussion of these measures, see M. GRANT, RATE CAPPING
AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE ACT 1988 (Sweet & Max-
well, Ltd. eds. 1989).
7. The expenditure beyond the level that central government assumes to be neces-
sary for each authority to deliver a common level of services. Expenditure up to that
level is underwritten (1) by national nondomestic rate, which is a property tax on all
commercial and industrial property and is now levied and collected nationally, and re-
distributed to local governments by the Treasury on a per capita basis; and (2) by reve-
nue support grant met from national taxation, calculated for each authority according to
a formula which would allow that authority to set a charge corresponding to a standard
national level of community charge.
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long run (after some complicated short-term transitional readjustments
in shifting to the new system). Therefore, the attraction of passing infra-
structure costs on to developers is likely to continue to grow.
In contrast with local government, landowners and private devel-
opers able to obtain permission to develop, in a buoyant land market in
which prices are maintained because of the rationing effects of the plan-
ning system, have had resources to finance infrastructure. In Britain,
such contributions are generally tax deductible, whether by the devel-
oper against corporation tax, or by the landowner from whom he ac-
quires a site and who faces capital gains tax liability. Although deter-
mining where the true cost of these contributions actually falls is
complicated, the most likely explanation in relation to a green field site
is that it bears directly, and in policy terms, most appropriately, upon
the price paid for the land by the developer.! Moreover, the scale of con-
tribution required may be relatively insubstantial when set beside fast-
rising land values for developable land,9 and it has often proved a worth-
while investment to bring development forward in an era when high
interest rates make landholding expensive.
Against these pressures, local authorities in both countries have in-
creasingly expected private developers to pay for infrastructure proj-
ects, in whole or in part, as a contribution to the public price of private
development. In Britain, the trend is not limited to local authorities:
Central government has pursued similar aims in regularly seeking de-
velopers' contributions (commonly at the rate of 100 percent) to finance
new works on main highways where they are required to accommodate
new development.'°
However, this trend raises profound legal issues about the propriety
of such requirements and the point at which the line is to be drawn be-
tween legitimate and illegitimate practice. It is not surprising that the
same questions are being asked on both sides of the Atlantic. How close
must the linkage or nexus be between the exaction, fee, or dedication
8. See Grant, Planning and Land Taxation: Development Land Tax and Beyond-
1, [1986] J.P.L. 4, 52.
9. Land which has a value of £2,500 per acre in its agricultural use may currently
change hands at as much as £300,000 with planning permission and services for residen-
tial development, allowing a generous margin against which to set servicing costs.
10. Now in the process of being formalised by powers contained in the NEW ROADS
AND STREET WORKS BILL 1990, cl. 20, substituting a new § 278 in the HIGHWAYS ACT
1980. For the background to this measure, see DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT & THE
WELSH OFFICE JOINT NOTE, DEVELOPMENT IN THE VICINITY OF TRUNK ROADS:
GUIDANCE TO DEVELOPERS ON AGREEMENTS UNDER SECTION 278 OF THE HIGHWAYS
ACT 1980, April 1989; DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT, NEW ROADS BY NEW MEANS:
BRINGING IN PRIVATE FINANCE CM 698, 6-10, May 1989.
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and the need for new public improvements that the proposed land devel-
opment will generate? Is it enough that there is a public need or must
there be something more? The difference between the approach of the
two countries is that these questions are regarded in the United States as
issues of law, to be resolved against the basic precepts of the United
States Constitution, and particularly the prohibition against the "tak-
ing" of property without just compensation." There has been some im-
portant litigation in the United States Supreme Court in recent years. In
Britain, the picture is far more confused. Advice issued by the Depart-
ment of the Environment has attempted to draw distinctions between
good and bad practice, but has often simply been ignored in the unholy
alliance that sometimes exists between developers and local authorities.
The government's signals remain obscure, not least in its presenting a
Bill'2 to Parliament in late 1990 which seeks to reform the machinery
through which planning gain is negotiated so as to allow developers to
give unilateral undertakings to local authorities, as well as to enter into
binding agreements. The Bill reforms procedure, but seems to reflect no
new thinking on the substance.
IH. The Basis of British Planning Control
In Britain, the legal basis for planning gain is the power of local planning
authorities to grant or refuse planning permission. Although there is some
limited "as of right" development, it is defined by national legislation 3
rather than by local zoning. All other development requires planning per-
mission, and the local authority has wide discretion in deciding whether
or not to grant such permission. Their development plan is not determina-
tive: They must "have regard to" its provisions, and also to any other
"material considerations." 4 The applicant has a right of appeal to the
Secretary of State against adverse exercise of that power, but appeal takes
11. Bosselman & Stroud, Legal Aspects of Development Exactions, DEVELOPMENT
EXACTIONS (Frank & Rhodes, eds. 1987); Callies, Property Rights-Are There Any
Left?, 20 URB. LAW. 597 (1988); Peterson, Land Use Regulatory Approaches Revis-
ited: The New Supreme Court Approaches, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 335 (1988).
12. The PLANNING AND COMPENSATION BILL 1991, Cl. 12 of which substitutes a
new § 106 in the TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990. The 1990 Act is a consoli-
dation of earlier planning legislation, and § 106 is the successor to § 52 of the TOWN
AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1971.
13. The TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING GENERAL DEVELOPMENT ORDER 1988
and the TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING (USE CLASSES) ORDER 1987.
14. TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990, § 70(1). In Scotland agreements
are made under the corresponding provisions of the TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING
(SCOTLAND) ACT 1972, § 50. For a detailed account, see E. YOUNG AND J. ROWAN-
ROBINSON, PLANNING LAW AND PROCEDURE IN SCOTLAND (1985).
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some time, often over a year, and provides no guarantee of permission at
the end of the process. It is a "one-stop" permitting process. There is no
separate system of subdivision controls, and other new requirements-
such an environmental impact assessment-have simply been integrated
into the planning system rather than established alongside it. Adverse en-
vironmental impact is a "material consideration" entitling a local author-
ity to refuse planning permission.
Although the local planning authority has a clear statutory power to
impose any conditions it thinks fit when granting permission, courts
have read restrictions into the power. To be valid, a planning condition
must relate fairly and reasonably to the permitted development, it must
be imposed for a "planning" purpose, and it must not be manifestly
unreasonable.' 5 Conditions which require the payment of money-for
whatever purpose-or the dedication of land, are regarded as breaching
the third of those tests, even though the payment is intended to meet
some off-site requirement uniquely generated by the development and
the sum involved is reasonable. 6 It is a doctrinal, not an economic, cri-
terion. Thus, in Britain, exactions, dedications and fees are forced off
the face of the planning permission. Instead, they are negotiated against
the backcloth of the authority's discretionary power to withhold permis-
sion altogether (or its practical ability to delay granting it), but are then
recorded as private contractual arrangements. Local planning authori-
ties have various powers'7 to enter into agreements with landowners, of
which the most important features are not only that they may be enforce-
able against successors in title (and so inescapable by mere winding-up
or insolvency) but are also largely non-appealable. 18 At one time it was
widely assumed that such agreements were not confined by the tests for
validity applicable to planning conditions, but that belief has been badly
shaken by recent judicial pronouncements.'9 But it is clear that a local
planning authority's decision would be challengeable by judicial review
if it could be shown that the authority had granted or refused planning
15. Newbury District Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment, [1981]
A.C. 578.
16. Bradford City Council v. Secretary of State for the Environment, [1986] J.P.L.
598, (1986) 53 P. & C.R. 55.
17. The best known is § 106 of the TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990 (for-
merly known as § 52 agreements), but also important are the LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS) ACT 1982, § 33; the GREATER LONDON COUNCIL (GEN-
ERAL POWERS) ACT 1974, § 16 (for local authorities in the Greater London area); and
the HIGHWAYS ACT 1980, § 278 (for highways purposes, although not binding against
successors in title). For the full texts of these provisions, see ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLAN-
NING LAW AND PRACTICE P106 (Grant ed. 1991).
18. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text for exceptions.
19. See infra note 97.
THE URBAN LAWYER VOL. 23, No. 2
permission on the basis of a financial deal that did not relate in planning
terms to the development involved. Its decision in such a case would
have been actuated by considerations which were not "material," and
hence would be outside their statutory discretion.20
Yet the prospect of challenge in any given case is remote. If planning
permission is refused, the applicant has his remedy of appeal to the Sec-
retary of State, and the prospect of an award of costs against the plan-
ning authority if its conduct has been unreasonable. If permission is
granted, the developer has no interest in starting proceedings which will
put his permission at risk and delay development, and third parties are
likely to lack the information and resources necessary to go to court.
IV. The Basis of Planning Controls in
the United States
The British planning system, though administered primarily by local
government, is nonetheless highly centralised and comparatively uni-
form in its application throughout the country. But, in the United States,
the federal system of fifty states encourages greater variety in the sys-
tems of planning and development control, and hence in the mecha-
nisms for securing planning gain in the form of dedications, exactions
and fees.
The control of land use in the United States is principally a local gov-
ernment function. 2' There is no national uniformity, and no central gov-
ernment agency with functions equating to those of England's Depart-
ment of the Environment. The only measure of national importance is
the rough framework provided by a federally drafted (but not imposed)
Standard Zoning Enabling Act, which was adopted by most states fol-
lowing a 1926 United States Supreme Court decision which upheld the
most ubiquitous of the local land-use controls, the zoning ordinance. 23
Therefore, both subdivision and zoning regulations in the United States
are functions of local governments which derive their power to regulate
the use and development of land from enabling legislation made by each
20. See, e.g., the Covent Garden case, R. v. Westminster City Council, ex parte
Monahan, [1989] J.P.L. 107; [1989] 1 P.L.R. 36, especially the argument of
Staughton, L.J. (adapting the criteria for planning conditions) that, to be material, a
consideration must fairly and reasonably relate to the permitted development.
21. Garner & Callies, Planning Law in England and Wales and in the United States,
1 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 292 (1972); R. BABCOCK & 0. WEAVER, CITY ZONING: THE
ONCE AND FUTURE FRONTIER (1986).
22. A Standard State Zoning Enabling Act under which municipalities may adopt
zoning regulations (United States Dept. of Commerce, 1926).
23. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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state.2 4 State legislation is necessary because the exercise of land-use
controls is considered to be an exercise of the police power, 25 and that
power resides with the individual fifty states (and not the national gov-
ernment) under the federal system of government. The principal limit
upon state power so delegated is found in the fifth amendment to the
United States Constitution, which, as applied to the individual states by
the fourteenth amendment, forbids the taking of property except for apubli purpse an . . 26•
public purpose and upon payment of just compensation. Under certain
circumstances, a land-use regulation which on its face deprives a land-
owner of all economic use without being based on health, environmen-
tal protection, or protection of fiscal integrity, or which as applied takes
all use of such property and which interferes with legitimate investment-
backed expectations of the owner, is likely to be a constitutionally pro-
tected taking for which compensation is required, even if the taking is
"temporary." 27 It is this area of the law which provides a basis for liti-
gation over exactions, fees, and dedications: To what extent are they,
even though exercises of the police power, takings of property requiring
compensation? These requirements are usually exacted through the sub-
division, rather than the local zoning ordinance. 28
A. Subdivision Controls
Control over the subdivision of land ownership, although unknown in En-
gland, provides the principal means of controlling new development in
many countries. Its use in the United States for the regulation of land and
24. Garner& Callies, supra note 21; D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAWch. 9 (2d ed.
1982); D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW ch. 7 (1986); C.D. SANDS & M. LiBONATI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
ch. 16 (1981).
25. This refers to the constitutional power of state legislatures to take action to pro-
mote health, safety, morals or general welfare.
26. F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE ch. 8 (1973).
27. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304, 318 (1987) (compensation, rather than merely declaratory and injunctive relief, is
available for some regulatory takings, even if only "temporary," unless "insulated by
the state's power to enact safety regulations").
28. Local zoning is delegated from the state, the repository of police power, to units
of local government through the aforesaid zoning enabling act, based loosely on the
Standard Zoning Enabling Act. Such acts permit, but do not require, local governments
to divide the land area in their jurisdiction into districts or zones, and to list permitted
uses, their permitted height and density ("bulk" regulation) and conditional uses in
each. The map upon which the districts are drawn is called the "zoning map," and the
lists of uses, bulk regulations, definitions and so forth are collectively called the "text."
Also in the text are administrative regulations setting forth how the zoning ordinance
restrictions on a particular piece of property may be changed. There is also usually a
section in the text dealing with uses which were permitted at some past date, but now fail
to conform to the existing land use regulations for the district, called collectively "non-
conformities." See Garner & Callies, supra note 2 1.
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the dedication of public improvements is a relatively recent land-use con-
trol technique. 9 The modem subdivision ordinance developed from local
responses to so-called "plat acts" whereby it was declared to be legisla-
tive policy that no parcels should be divided and sold without the filing of
a plat, a scaled drawing of the parcel showing the division or divisions
into which it had been carved. Its purpose was to aid conveyancing. In
most common law jurisdictions, the buying and selling of land is subject
to so-called "recording" acts. These acts require the recording of land
transactions on an officially kept register so that the title, the state of the
ownership of a particular parcel, is ascertainable by reference to the title
record. Because such recording was a privilege rather than a right, it
could be made conditional on fulfilling specified obligations. o
Although a developer benefited by recording a plat, the advantages of
exercising the privilege of recording decreased as conditions and exac-
tions imposed by the municipality increased in scope and number.
Eventually, local governments enacted ordinances requiring the re-
cording of a plat prior to the conveyance of any lot. When platting be-
came a requirement, the privilege rationale for imposing exactions be-
came a fiction. Local governments and courts began to rely on the
rationale that conditions attached to subdivisions were a rational means
of protecting the health, safety and general welfare of the public. But the
idea of development as a privilege has not completely died.3'
At first, subdivision ordinances dealt primarily with an increasing vol-
ume of so-called design standards: width and composition of streets and
sidewalks, perimeter linkage, uniformity of building setback and the like.
Street and road standards often come by way of incorporating by reference
an "official map" showing where the community had decided to place its
streets. From the design and location of public facilities needed to serve
new subdivisions, it was an easy, if not necessarily logical, step to require
their construction as a condition of subdivision approval. Thus, many state
planning enabling acts directed local subdivision codes to require the build-
ing and dedication to the community of the streets, sewers, water mains,
sidewalks and other public facilities. The subdivision ordinance was well
on its way to becoming a development code by the 1950sf
29. For discussions of subdivision laws, their origin and application, see R.
FREILICH & P. LEVI, MODEL SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS: TEXT AND COMMENTARY
(1975); Garner & Callies, supra note 21, at 312; D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING ch. 9
(1971); D. MANDELKER, supra note 24, at ch. 9.
30. Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58 (1928).
31. See Trent Meredith, Inc. v. City of Oxnard, 114 Cal. App. 3d 317, 170 Cal.
Rptr. 685, 689 (1981).
32. D. MANDELKER, supra note 24, at §§ 9.1-9.3.
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A logical step from regulating the design of public facilities and their
dedication was the first mandatory showing of open space and public
building sites on subdivision plats, and finally requiring their "dedica-
tion" as well. The first, the showing of such public uses and conse-
quently prohibiting, even for a short time, an owner's developing such
sites, was both common and practical. Increasing residential construc-
tion logically increases the need for schools, police and fire stations and
parks. A number of state enabling acts directed that such sites should be
held open by a private owner only for a specified length of time, say, a
year, by which time the local government either had to purchase the site
or let the owner develop it. Even this limited requirement met with
owner resistance, sometimes resulting in litigation forcing the local
government to pay for the development-free period, as if it were an op-
tion to purchase the property .
The next step was more problematic: the required dedication of such
park, public building and school sites. The theory was much the same as
that supporting public improvement or dedication requirements: If an
owner of property sought to develop it in such a fashion as to add to the
population of a local government in a particular section of its jurisdic-
tion, it should provide its share of the park, school and public building
needs thereby generated. If the subdivision were too small to generate
the need for a "whole" site, then cash would do, to be paid (hopefully)
into a fund for the purchase of such a site as other subdivisions were
processed. Indeed, in a spate of recent cases, such mandatory dedica-
tion schemes have been upheld in a number of jurisdictions, usually so
long as the dedication of land is required to fill a need attributable to the
developer being asked to make the dedication or contribution. 34 Such
subdivision "exactions" are therefore increasingly commonplace, and
are often viewed as an acceptable growth management tool.
V. Subdivision Conditions:
Exactions, Dedications and Impact Fees
Required exactions and dedications of land within the proposed land de-
velopment have recently been eclipsed by impact fees and exactions for
33. Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor and Common Council of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108,
237 A.2d 881 (1968).
34. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d
606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1971); Krughoff v. City of
Naperville, 41 111. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff'd, 68 Ill. 2d 352, 369
N.E.2d 892 (1977); Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), reh'g
granted, 614 P.2d 1257 (1980).
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infrastructure outside the proposed development. The common law of
subdivision in the United States quickly moved to acceptance of condi-
tions precedent to subdivision plat approval that included dedication of
land for parks and roads and exactions for construction of traffic, water
and sewer improvements within the perimeter of the proposed develop-
ment.3 5 Indeed, it was once recommended that such dedications and ex-
actions should be so confined.36 However, a few cases in the 1940s,
1950s, and 1960s recognized that such developments often generate
needs for off-site infrastructure, and approved dedications and/or so-
called "in-lieu" fees to be levied against such developments to pay for
them.37
These, coupled with the aforesaid drastic reductions in revenues
available to local governments from traditional ad valorem real prop-
erty taxes and federal government program funds, led in the 1970s to the
formulation of one of the most innovative and potentially burdensome
(for landowners) mechanisms for the funding of public facilities, made
necessary by growth: the impact fee. Recent United States litigation
over such fees raises basic legal issues over the propriety of conditions
on subdivision generally. Typically, an impact fee is levied upon a de-
velopment to pay for public facilities the need for which is generated, at
least in part, by that development.38 In assessing the validity of such fees
and other off-site exactions, courts usually address the relationship be-
tween the development upon which the fee was levied and the amount
and use planned for the fee. Generally, state courts have used three ap-
proaches in determining the reasonableness of this relationship: 9
35. R. FREILICH & P. LEVI, supra note 29, at 2-3. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust & Sav.
Bank v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 352, 176 N.E.2d 789 (1961); State ex rel.
Nowlind v. St. Louis Co., 478 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1972); Broes v. Smith, 304 N.Y. 164,
106 N.E.2d 503 (1952); McKain v. Toledo City Planning Comm'n, 26 Ohio App. 2d
171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971).
36. Reps & Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1105
(1963).
37. E.g., Ayres v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); Jenad,
Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
38. Callies, Impact Fees, Exactions and Payingfor Growth in Hawaii, 11 U. HAW.
L. REV. 295 (1989); Blaesser & Kentopp, Impact Fees: The Second Generation, 38
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990); Juergensmeyer, Funding Infrastructure:
Paying the Costs of Growth Through Impact Fees and Other Land Regulation Charges,
LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY MONOGRAPH 85- 5 (Feb. 1985); D. CALLIES & R.
FREILICH, CASES & MATERIALS ON LAND USE ch. 4 (1986).
39. Smith, A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5 (1987); Callies, supra note 38, at 300-307.
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1. the "rational nexus" test, as applied by the Florida courts and a
growing majority of other jurisdictions;4°
2. the more restrictive "specifically and uniquely attributable" test,
as formerly applied in Illinois and Rhode Island' and now largely
rejected everywhere; and
3. the less restrictive-indeed generous-" reasonable relationship"
test, applied primarily by the California courts and largely re-
jected by the United States Supreme Court, as discussed below.
This leaves only the rational nexus test. The rational nexus test is the
most widely used standard for examining development exactions, par-
ticularly the impact fee. First proposed by Heyman and Gilhool in
1964,2 the test was quickly picked up by courts in both New York and
Wisconsin in landmark dedication and exaction cases .4' According to
some commentators, it became the "national standard" by the end of
the 1970s." The test has two parts. First, the particular development
must create a "need," to which the amount of the exaction bears some
roughly proportional relationship.45 Second, the local government must
demonstrate that the fees levied will actually be used for the purpose
collected, by proper "earmarking" and timely expenditure of the
funds. 6
The Florida courts adopted the rational nexus test for impact fees in a
series of recent decisions, beginning with Contractor & Builders Asso-
ciation v. City of Dunedin.4 There, the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the concept of impact fees, even though it struck down the particular
ordinance requiring an impact fee for sewer and water connection for
40. See, e.g., Hernando County v. Budget Inns of Fla., Inc., 555 So. 2d 1319 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Frisella v. Town of Farmington, 131 N.H. 78, 550 A.2d 102
(1988); Baltica Constr. Co. v. Planning Bd. of Town of Franklin, 222 N.J. Super. 428,
537 A.2d 319 (1988); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22
(1989); Unlimited v. Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 750 P.2d 651 (1988).
41. See, e.g., Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910
(1970); Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961).
42. Heyman & Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community
Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119
(1964). Seealso Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 11; D. CALLIES&R. FREILICH, CASES
& MATERIALS ON LAND USE ch. 4 (1986).
43. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966);
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 22 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
44. See Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 11, at 74.
45. Bosselman & Stroud, Mandatory Tithes: The Legality of Land Development
Linkage, 9 NOVA L.J. 381, 397-99 (1985); see also Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Town-
ship of Holmdel, 129 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990).
46. Id.
47. 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976).
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failing sufficiently to restrict the use of fees collected: "In principle,
however, we see nothing wrong with transferring to the new user of a
municipally owned water or sewer system a fair share of the costs new
use of the system involves. ,48
For an impact fee ordinance to be valid, the court held that: (1) new
development must generate a need for expansion of public facilities;
(2) the fees imposed must be no more than what the municipality would
incur in accommodating the new users of the system; and (3) the fees
must be expressly earmarked for the purposes for which they were
charged.49
These requirements were further refined in Hollywood, Inc. v. Bro-
ward County.' The Hollywood, Inc. court upheld an ordinance requir-
ing dedication, an in-lieu fee, or an impact fee as a condition of plat
approval, to be used for the capital costs of expanding the county park
system.' The court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of the
police power:
[W]e discern the general legal principle that reasonable dedication or impact fee re-
quirements are permissible so long as they offset needs sufficiently attributable to the
subdivision and so long as the funds collected are sufficiently earmarked for the sub-
stantial benefit of the subdivision residents. In order to satisfy these requirements,
the local government must demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus,
between the need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population gener-
ated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must show a reasonable connec-
tion, or rational nexus, between the expenditures of the funds collected and the bene-
fits accruing to the subdivision."
Seven months later, another Florida court upheld an impact fee for road
improvements in Home Builders & Contractors Association v. Board of
Palm Beach County Commissioners . The county ordinance required
new land development activity generating road traffic (including resi-
dential, commercial and industrial uses) to pay a fair share of the cost of
expanding new roads attributable to the new development. The court
found that the ordinance met the Dunedin tests for a valid impact fee
because it recognized that the rapid rate of new development would re-
quire a substantial increase in the capacity of the county road system,
and tied this need to the new development by a formula based on the
48. Id. at 317-18.
49. See id. at 318-21.
50. 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 352 (1983).
51. See id.
52. Id. at 612.
53. 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Ct. App. 1983). There are many cases in accord. Among
the more recent: City of Hallandale v. Acmar Engineering Corp., 560 So. 2d 802 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Tidewater Ass'n of Homebuilders v. City of Virginia Beach, No.
900451 (Va. Jan. 11, 1991) (LEXIS, States library).
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costs of road construction and number of motor vehicle trips generated
by different types of land use.5" This development of the nexus test was
both confirmed and overshadowed by the United States Supreme Court
in 1987.
VI. The Nollan Doctrine
Decided on the last day of the United States Supreme Court's 1987
Term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission' deals ostensibly with
beach access. The plaintiffs sought a coastal development permit from
the California Coastal Commission in order to tear down a beach house
and build a bigger one.56 The Commission imposed a condition on the
permit, requiring the granting of an easement to permit the public to use
one-third of the property on the beach side. 7 For the privilege of sub-
stantially upgrading a beach house, the owner was forced to dedicate to
the public lateral access over much of his backyard for more beach for
the public to walk upon.58 The California Court of Appeals had held this
was a valid exercise of the Commission's police power under its statu-
tory duty to protect the California Coast.5 9
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 60 Noting that the taking of
such an access over private property by itself would require compensa-
tion, the Court then examined whether the same requirement, imposed
under the police or regulatory power of the Commission rather than un-
der its powers of eminent domain, would modify the "just compensa-
tion" requirement.6'
The direct holding of the Court was that in this case it did not and that
compensation was required. 62 The rationale of the Court is critical. The
Court observed that land-use regulations do not effect takings if they
substantially advance legitimate state interests and do not deny an owner
the economically viable use of his land.63 But even assuming (without
deciding) that legitimate state interests include, in the Commission's
words, protecting public views of the beach and assisting the public in
54. No. 900451, at 7.
55. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
56. See id. at 828. See also Freilich & Morgan, Municipal Strategies for Imposing
Valid Development Exactions: Responding toNollan, 10 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 169
(Dec. 1987).
57. 483 U.S. at 828.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 830-31.
60. See id. at 841-42.
61. ld. at 831-37.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 835-36.
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overcoming the psychological barrier to the beach created by overde-
velopment, the Court could not accept the Commission's position that
there was any nexus between these interests and the condition attached
to Nollan's beach house redevelopment:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on the
public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any obstacles to
viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible to understand how
it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the public beaches, or how it helps to
remedy any additional congestion on them caused by construction of the Nollans'
new house. We therefore find that the Commission's imposition of the permit condi-
tion cannot be treated as an exercise of its land use power for any of these purposes."'
VII. Sic Transit "Linkage"
However, said the Court, it is an altogether different matter if there is an
"essential nexus" between the condition (read impact fee or exaction)
and what the landowner proposes to do with the property:
Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have pro-
tected the public's ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new
house-for example, a height limitation, a width restriction, or a ban on fences-so
long as the Commission could have exercised its police power (as we have assumed it
could) to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition
would also be constitutional. Moreover (and here we come closer to the facts of the
present case), the condition would be constitutional even if it consisted of the require-
ment that the Nollans provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with
whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.... The evident consti-
tutional propriety disappears, however, if the condition substituted for the prohibi-
tion utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition....
[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building
restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose
then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid gov-
ernmental purpose, but without payment of compensation. Whatever may be the
outer limits of "legitimate state interests" in the takings and land-use context, this is
not one of them.'5
In short, the Supreme Court appears to have adopted the "rational
nexus" test concerning exactions, in-lieu fees and impact fees, over the
broader California rule which apparently affected the imposition of the
condition on the Nollan property. The case also means that naked link-
age programs 6 which seek to impose fees, dedications and conditions
on the development process merely because the developer needs a per-
mit and the public sector needs an unrelated public project are in all
64. Id. at 838-39.
65. Id. at 836-37.
66. See, e.g., Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 45; Callies, supra note 38; Valla,
Linkage: The Next Stop In Developing Exactions, 2 GROWTH MANAGEMENT STUDIES
NEWSLETTER No. 4 (June 1987); Kayden & Pollard, Linkage Ordinances and Tradi-
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probability also illegal. As one well-known commentator suggests in
comments upon a proposed Chicago linkage program: 67
It will be difficult enough to sustain a housing linkage program on the ground that
there is a reasonable relationship between the construction of commercial office
space and the need for additional housing. It will be even more difficult to demon-
strate that connection when the exacted payments are used for a variety of unknown
neighbourhood development projects.
VII. Post-Nollan Decisions
There has been little time for a substantial body of common law to de-
velop around Nollan. So far the few cases that have been decided by
lower courts do not give much guidance.
The California courts are testing the extent of the Nollan "nexus"
language by upholding a California Coastal Commission permit re-
quirement that a club impose a membership condition precluding dis-
crimination in order to obtain a commission development permit. 69 The
court reasoned that:
Here, in contrast [to Nollan] there is a direct connection between the governmental
purpose of maximizing public access to state beach land, and the condition which
was imposed. Again, by precluding discrimination against minorities in the club's
membership policies, the Commission maximized the possibility that all segments of
the public will have access to the legal land.70
An appellate case interpreting Nollan more narrowly is easily distin-
guishable as it deals solely with the question of who should pay for pub-
lic access."
It has also been suggested that the Nollan case will force local govern-
ments to reexamine their "traditional" subdivision exactions for such
tional Exactions Analysis, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127 (1987); Alterman, Evaluat-
ing Linkage and Beyond, 34 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. LAW 3 (1988); D. CALLIES
& R. FREILICH, CASES & MATERIALS ON LAND USE ch. 4 (1986). But see Holmdel Build-
ers Ass'n v. Township of Holmdel, 121 N.J. 550, 583 A.2d 277 (1990) (upholding im-
pact fees for housing as functional equivalents of mandatory set-asides, which the court
had already approved under New Jersey's constitutionally based "fair share" doc-
trine).
67. See Schwanke, Local Government and Impact Fees, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL.
LAW 215 (1989).
68. Smith, supra note 39, at 28.
69. Jonathan Club v. California Coastal Comm'n, 197 Cal. App. 3d 884, 243 Cal.
Rptr. 168 (1988).
70. 243 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
71. Augustson v. King County, 49 Wash. App. 409, 743 P.2d 282 (1987). The
Maryland Court of Appeals also cited Nollan in Maryland Port Admin. v. Q.C. Corp.,
310 Md. 379,529 A.2d 829 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), but only for the obvious propo-
sition (after Keystone and First Lutheran) that a taking can occur without a physical
invasion. For further discussion, see Callies, supra note 11.
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as public street dedications in light of the "essential nexus" test to see if
they will withstand a takings challenge.12 Something of what Justice
Scalia meant-and around which he forged his majority in Nollan-can
be gleaned from his dissent in the recently decided rent control case of
Pennell v. San Jose.73 In departing from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opin-
ion upholding San Jose's rent control law-and particularly that part
which appears to uphold the most controversial provision permitting the
denial of rent increases on the basis of a tenant's ability to pay-Justice
Scalia distinguishes "traditional" land-use regulations which do not
"totally destroy the economic value of property," which he is appar-
ently quite willing to accept. 7
Traditional land-use regulations (short of that which totally destroy
the economic value of property) do not violate this principle because
there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use re-
stricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to
remedy. Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regula-
tion, would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he
has been singled out unfairly. Thus, the common zoning regulations re-
quiring subdividers to reserve certain areas to public streets are in ac-
cord with our constitutional traditions because the proposed property
use would otherwise be the cause of excessive congestion.
This language is significant for several reasons. First, Scalia appears to
accept the "destruction of all economic use" test set forth in Keystone
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis,75 the first of the "trilogy"
cases, lacking which, a regulation of land is not a taking of property for
constitutional purposes. Second, Justice Scalia appears ready to accept a
police power basis for such traditional land-use regulation well beyond
health and safety, and certainly beyond nuisance. Correcting a social evil
is sufficient basis, which smacks of general welfare. Third, traditional
exactions such as road dedications and setbacks are legal, always pro-
vided there is some sort of connection-like the need to avoid traffic con-
gestion. This is all a far cry from the more extreme potential interpreta-
tions of Nollan, and far closer to the views expressed by the majority in
Keystone, from which Justice Scalia joined in vigorous dissent.
Conditions upon land development approvals are now both common
and constitutional in the United States. After the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Nollan, the use of impact fees and exactions will in
72. Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 11.
73. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
74. Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
75. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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all probability continue to proliferate. The need to supplement, if not
supplant, traditional sources of revenue at the local government level is
acute. So long as there is an adequate, essential, rational "nexus" be-
tween the condition imposed and the development-generated problem
which it seeks to remedy, there will be no constitutional bar to its use.
IX. Development Agreements:
United States Style
Most of the legal issues raised above concerning the need for linkage or
nexus and concerns about the taking issue are relatively easily resolved if
landowner-developer and local government can come to agreeable terms
over what the developer will contribute in exchange for guarantees from
the local authority, such as certainty with respect to planning permis-
sions, and memorialize these terms in a statutory development agree-
ment. Thus, development agreements resemble British planning agree-
ments, and, in particular, they symbolise the use of negotiation rather
than imposed conditions on new development proposals. But their opera-
tion differs in a critical respect, which is that a major advantage to the
developer lies in securing a guarantee of development rights. For al-
though a United States developer may have automatic development rights
in accordance with the zoning scheme, he has no guarantee that the
scheme will not be changed or other regulatory requirements imposed
once the development process has commenced. To secure that guarantee
on a major project he may be willing to assume substantial infrastructure
responsibilities. In Britain, the grant of planning permission is suffic-
ient: The local authority can change its terms unilaterally only if it pays
full compensation. But a local government may insist that the developer
sign a planning agreement before he is granted a planning permission,
and until then he normally has no valuable development rights at all. A
planning agreement secures developers' obligations against the land.
Thus, a development agreement in the United States is a contract be-
tween a unit of local government and a private holder of property devel-
opment rights. The principal purposes of the development agreement
are to guarantee to the developer which land development regulations
will apply to the subject property during the term of the agreement and
to guarantee to the local government unit what exactions, improvements
and charges the landowner-developer will make and pay during the term
of the agreement. The purpose of the agreement is to vest certain devel-
opment rights in the developer in exchange for the construction and ded-
ication of public improvements. As it is generally legally difficult, if not
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impossible, for the landowner-developer to obtain enforceable assur-
ances that land-use regulations may not change during the life of major
land development projects, particularly multi-phase development proj-
ects extending over many years, and as there are still limits (though they
appear constantly to be pushed back by the courts) to what local govern-
76
ment can extract as a price for permitting land development , both par-
ties in theory have adequate reason to negotiate such an agreement.
From a contractual perspective, there is adequate consideration flow-
ing to support such a bilateral agreement. The latter may be particularly
important given the frequent use of conditional zoning, which often bor-
ders on contract zoning, whereby local government units reclassify
property to permit more intense development upon the developer's
promise to do certain things which are memorialized in one or more uni-
lateral covenants, duly deposited with the local government and re-
corded. However, covenants are generally on their face devoid of any
mutuality, and local government actions to enforce them have often
been unsuccessful. Therefore, a bilateral contract, particularly one
which is sanctioned by the state through enabling legislation reciting the
public purpose behind such agreement, is by far a more sound way to
proceed. Moreover, the unilateral deposit of covenants by the developer
noted above provides little assurance that the local government will
maintain the zoning for which the promises set out in the covenants were
made.
Private sector need for a mechanism to guarantee the continued appli-
cability of existing (or new) development regulations with respect to a
particular project grew from dissatisfaction with cases deciding the
point at which a landowner's right to proceed with a project, legal when
conceptualized or commenced, in the face of changed regulations pro-
hibiting such development. Rooted in the concept of nonconformities,
the concept of "vested rights" is variously interpreted throughout the
United States to provide that developers are guaranteed to be able to
proceed with such developments from after a simple rezoning to only
after the issuance of a building permit.77 It is holdings in the latter cate-
gory that prompted vested rights bills to be drafted in two of the states
76. Bosselman & Stroud, supra note 45; Blaesser & Kentopp, supra note 38.
77. C. SIEMON, W. LARSEN & D. PORTER, VESTED RIGHTS" BALANCING PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT EXPECTATIONS (1982). In California, the first state to pass
such a bill, it was Avco Community Developers v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 17
Cal. 3d 785, 553 P.2d 546, 132 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1976), which galvanized the develop-
ment community into seeking legislative relief. Despite the expenditure of nearly $3
million and the rough grading of 74 acres, the California Supreme Court ruled that after
state legislation enacted for the protection of the coastal zone was passed, a permit from
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with full-blown vested rights/development agreements bills: Califor-
nia and Hawaii.
Implementation has been very rapid since the passage of the Califor-
nia statute. According to a recent survey of over 450 cities and counties,
approximately 150 are using the development agreement and another
100 express an interest in using them. Of the former number, over 300
development agreements are in effect with approximately 150 addi-
tional such agreements in the process of negotiation. The development
agreement appears to be used by cities of all sizes, and for single-stage
and multistage projects alike, although predictably the number of such
agreements is largest in the larger California cities."8
X. Legal Issues: Contracting Away the
Police Power and Binding Future
Local Governments
It is black letter law in the United States that local governments may not
"contract away the police power," 79 paicularly in the context of zon-
ing decisions.S° It is considered to be against public policy to permit the
bargaining of zoning and subdivision regulations for agreements and
the agency upon which the coastal protection responsibility was conferred was neces-
sary before Avco's rights to continue developing vested. Id. at 550-55. This was be-
cause such rights did not vest in California until the issuance of a building permit, even
though developers incurred substantial costs prior to the issuing of such a permit. Id.
In Hawaii, the second state to pass a development agreements bill (modeled exten-
sively after the California bill), the bill was spawned by County of Kauai v. Pacific
Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Haw. 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982), colloquially known as the
"Nukolii" case after the beach upon which the proposed hotel and condominium devel-
opment was to be constructed. There, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that rights to
develop did not vest until a last discretionary permit was issued. Id. at 776. As it hap-
pened, that last discretionary permit was held to be the holding of a referendum on the
applicable beach zoning, since the petition for the placing of rezoning on the ballot was
certified before shoreland management permits-normally the last discretionary per-
mits in the land development process in the County of Kauai at that time-were granted.
Id. Hawaii has since declared initiatives and referenda to be illegal means for addressing
zoning issues in Hawaii. Kaiser Hawaii Kai Dev. Co. v. City and County of Honolulu,
70 Haw. 480, 777 P.2d 244 (1989). See Callies, Neuffer & Caliboso, Ballot Box Zon-
ing: Initiative, Referendum and the Law, 39 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 53
(1991).
78. Cowart, Kresmodel & Stewart, Development Agreements: Widespread Use
Exceeds Expectations, 1986 QUARTERLY REPORT, CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND UR-
BAN ECONOMICS, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY (4th Quarter).
79. Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 499 Pa. 498, 453 A.2d 1382 (1982).
80. Cederberg v. City of Rockford, 8 111. App. 3d 984,291 N.E.2d 249 (1972); see
also Houston Petroleum Co. v. Automotive Products Credit Ass'n, 9 N.J. 122, 87 A.2d
319, 332 (1952) ("Contracts thus have no place in a zoning plan and a contract between
a municipality and a property owner should not enter into the enactment or enforcement
of zoning regulations."); Zahodiakin Eng'g Corp. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 8 N.J.
386, 86 A.2d 127 (1952).
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stipulations on the part of developers to do or refrain from doing certain
things."' The equivalent limitation in Britain is that a local authority may
not, by contract, fetter the exercise of a statutory discretion. Although
the limits to the doctrine are often difficult to discern in practice, 2 the
courts have insisted that it does apply to section 106 agreements ." Thus,
a local authority could not accept a contractual obligation in a planning
agreement to grant planning permission in the future for further devel-
opment, or to refrain from taking enforcement action against un-
authorised development.
The prohibition against bargaining away the police power finds its
source in the so-called "reserved power doctrine.' 4Under this doc-
trine, bargaining away the police power is the equivalent of a current
legislature attempting to exercise legislative power reserved to later leg-
islatures. 5 However, an analysis of the cases indicates that what the
courts generally inveigh against is such bargaining away forever, or at
least for a very long time. The source of the doctrine, Corporation of the
Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty of
New York,16 involved a municipal abrogation of a lease executed over
fifty years before. While some later cases do involve invalidation of mu-
nicipal action just a few years old, the majority deal with events further
back in time. Moreover, a number of such agreements have been upheld
by the application of the contracts clause of the United States Constitu-
tion which prohibits states from passing laws which abrogate con-
87tracts . In any event, as recent commentators have noted, the current
application of the reserved powers clause when used to abrogate
government-private contracts has been rare, and courts have attempted
to find other grounds to uphold those contracts which are fair, just, rea-
81. Carlino, 499 Pa. 498, 453 A.2d 1382; Zahodiakin, 8 N.J. 386, 86 A.2d 127
(1952).
82. R. v. London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham, ex parte Beddowes,
[1987] 1 All E.R. 369.
83. Windsor and Maidenhead Royal Borough Council v. Brandrose Investments
Ltd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 509.
84. Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Develop-
ment Agreements and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65
N.C.L. REV. 957, 994-1003 (1987). See also Kramer, Development Agreements. To
What Extent Are They Enforceable? 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 29 (1981); Kessler, The De-
velopment Agreement And Its Use In Resolving Large Scale, Multi-Party Development
Problems, 1 J. LAND USE & INT'L L. 451 (1985); Goldwich, Development Agree-
ments: A Critical Introduction, 4 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 249 (1989).
85. See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880); Corporation of the Brick Pres-
byterian Church v. Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty of New York, 5 Cowens (N.Y.)
538 (1826) discussed in Kramer, supra note 85, at 37-39.
86. 5 Cowens (N.Y.) 538 (1826).
87. Carruth v. City of Madera, 223 Cal. App. 2d 688, 43 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1965).
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sonable and advantageous to the local government. In sum, it is un-
likely that courts will fall back upon the reserved powers clause in inval-
idating development agreements passed pursuant to state statute,
especially if the agreements have a fixed termination date (as they must
under both California and Hawaii's statutory schemes) and that date is
not decades away.
In any event, does a development agreement statute provide any relief
from such a rule, however infrequently applied? The answer is yes,
probably. What the courts which condemn such zoning by agreement
inveigh against is the abridgment of powers which protect the general
welfare 9 and the "bartering ... [of] legislative discretion for emolu-
ments that had no bearing on the merits of the requested amendment.' 9°
Since there are yet no reported appellate cases dealing with state de-
velopment agreement statutes, what an appellate court would say for
sure is speculative. However, the prognosis appears to be good, based
on cases upholding annexation agreements and cooperative agree-
ments. 9'
Moreover, two California Superior Court cases in which development
agreements figure prominently basically support the technique, although
the validity of the agreements was not ultimately at issue in either. 92 In-
deed, in dicta in Lincoln Property Co. v. Torrance,93 the court said:
[If the city sought to impose requirements inconsistent or in conflict with the Devel-
opment Agreement, it would violate rights possessed by Lincoln which are both
vested and fundamental [but]... the rejection of underground parking, the require-
ment of "for sale" condominiums and concern about aesthetics and landscaping are
not inconsistent or in conflict with the Development Agreement.
94
88. See Kramer, supra note 85, at 41; Carruth, 223 Cal. App. 2d 688, 43 Cal. Rptr.
855.
89. Carlino v. Whitpain Investors, 499 Pa. 498, 453 A.2d 1382 (1982).
90. Hedrich v. Village of Niles, 112 111. App. 2d 68, 250 N.E.2d 791 (1969).
91. See, e.g., Morrison Homes Corp. v. City of Pleasanton, 58 Cal. App. 3d 724,
130 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1976) (annexation and zoning and sewer connections for annexation
and annexation fees); Housing Auth. v. City of Los Angeles, 38 Cal. 2d 853, 243 P.2d
515 (1952) (redevelopment agreements); Meegan v. Village of Tinley Park, 52 Ill. 2d
354, 288 N.E.2d 423 (1972) (interpreting limitations on a pre-statute annexation agree-
ment, thereby upholding the process by implication); Mayor and City Council of Balti-
more v. Crane, 227 Md. 198, 352 A.2d 786 (1976) (redevelopment agreements); Hous-
ing Redevelopment Auth. v. Jorgensen, 328 N.W.2d 740 (Minn. 1983) (low-rent
housing for zoning).
92. See Continental Development Corp. v. Hart, No. C617808, slip op. (Super. Ct.
County of Los Angeles, California, Oct. 21, 1986); Lincoln Property Co. v. City of
Torrance, No. C607339, slip op. (Super. Ct. County of Los Angeles, California, Nov.
4, 1986).
93. Lincoln Property Co., slip op.
94. Id., slip op. at 3.
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Finally, what informed commentary there has been on the various stat-
utes appears to agree that courts should have little difficulty in support-
ing development agreements against reserved powers/bargaining away
the police power claims, especially if there is supporting state legisla-
tion. 95 In sum, development agreement statutes and their provisions for
freezing land-use controls in exchange for infrastructure and public fa-
cility dedications will probably be upheld.
XI. Britain: Planning Gain and the Validity of
Section 106 Agreements
There is no parallel in British case law to the detailed United States analy-
sis of allocating off-site development costs, yet the seeds of a similar un-
derlying concern are apparent. For a start, there has been very little litiga-
tion. This reflects not only the comparatively limited function of judicial
review in Britain, but also a want of informed and interested plaintiffs.
Planning gain deals tend to be negotiated individually and opportunisti-
cally. Rarely are the full details publicised. Developers' contributions to
the public costs of providing physical infrastructure, particularly high-
ways, are now commonplace and unremarkable. There is in practice no
formal test of a proportional relationship between the need generated by
the development and the sum contributed, and deals are negotiated indi-
vidually. The actual relationship therefore depends to a large extent on
the bargaining strength of the parties. A developer may be willing to con-
tribute beyond his share if it means that development can start earlier, or
if he can devise some way of recovering contributions subsequently from
neighbouring developers (such as by controlling access to the facilities
provided). Moreover, there is no general requirement that the contribu-
tion be earmarked for the specified purpose, and there has been some con-
cern in the past that certain types of contribution, such as commuted car
parking payments, have never been properly applied.
95. DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS (Porter &
Marsh, eds. 1989). Wegner, supra note 85; Griffith, Local Goverment Contracts: Es-
caping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277 (1990).
Kessler, supra note 85; Hagman, Development Agreements, 3 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP.
65 (1980); D. CalF~es, Land Development Regulations in C.D. SANDS & M. LIBONATI,
supra note 24, at § 16.55; ABBOT, D. CALLIES & W. HOLLIMAN, DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS AND VESTED RIGHTS: A SECOND LOOK (1983); Holliman, Development
Agreements and Vested Rights In California, 13 URn. LAW. 44 (1981); LEAGUE OF
CALIFORNIA CITIES, DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS (1980); Zeid, Land Use Planning By
Agreement: The Practice in England and California (draft law review note); CURTIN,
CALIFORNIA LAND USE AND PLANNING LAW (1986); D. MANDELKER, supra note 24, at
§ 6.21; Kramer, supra note 85. But see for a different view, Crew, Development Agree-
ments After Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 22 URB. LAW. 23 (1990).
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The real public concern, however, is with deals going beyond these,
such as where a developer agrees to provide some non-essential or unre-
lated facility. These deals are rarely challenged. Where challenge has
occurred, it has generally been to the wrong thing: the legal instrument
used (a statutory agreement) rather than the substance of the deal (the
grant of planning permission in return for making the contribution). The
question of the lawful scope of section 106 agreements has recently be-
come one of the most confused areas of contemporary planning law, as
the result of a series of recent judicial rulings which are substantially at
odds with contemporary practice (and appear indeed to be generally ig-
nored by practitioners). The problem started with some dicta in the
Court of Appeal in Bradford City Council v. Secretary of State for the
Environment,96 where Lloyd, L.J., observed:
I do not accept [counsel for the Secretary of State's] submission that the present con-
dition would have been lawful if incorporated in a [section 106] agreement. If the
condition was manifestly unreasonable, and so beyond the powers of the planning
authority to impose it, whether or not the developers consented, it must follow that it
was also beyond the powers of the planning authority to include the condition as "an
incidental or consequential provision" of an agreement restricting or regulating the
development or use of land under [section 106] .9'
The first difficulty is with the words "it must follow," because the logic
of the progression is anything but clear. Section 106 does not restrict the
normal contractual power of a local planning authority. Its purpose is to
allow certain types of agreement (those regulating or restricting the use
or development of land) to be enforceable against successors in title.
Although an agreement may fall outside section 106, it may still be con-
tractually enforceable, unless, of course, the Court of Appeal is urging a
different test for all local authority contracts from that applicable to pri-
vate individuals. Moreover, the analysis concentrates only on section
106, leaving to one side the other statutory powers under which enforce-
able agreements may be concluded. 98 Since it is customary for an agree-
ment to recite that it is made under each and every of these statutory
provisions, there is great practical difficulty in unpicking the details.
Secondly, the argument proceeds from the assumption that a term re-
quiring the payment of money is manifestly unreasonable. The estab-
lished doctrine appears to be that such a payment may not be insisted upon
by a planning condition, although it may be in lieu of meeting a legitimate
planning requirement, because any such requirement would be regarded
96. [1986] J.P.L. 598, (1986) 53 P. & C.R. 55.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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as doctrinally unreasonable whatever its economic justification.99 That
may be a sensible approach to unilaterally imposed planning conditions,
but there seems little justification for transposing it across to negotiated
agreements. Moreover, the Court of Appeal appears to have confused the
basis of the doctrine when it proceeded to suggest that:
That is not to say that this might not have been a case for a more limited agreement
under [section 106]. A contribution towards the cost of [road widening] might well
have been reasonable, due to the increased use of the road resulting from the devel-
opment, and the benefit to the occupiers of the residential development: see Circular
22/83, "Planning Gain," where the considerations are well set out in 6-8. See
also 3 and 6 of Appendix A. But I need not pursue that consideration further. For
therc is all the difference in the world between a provision of a [section 106] agree-
ment requiring a contribution from a developer towards the cost of widening a high-
way and a0provision which requires the entire works to be carried out at his risk and
expense.
But again the position is more complex than this. It is difficult to com-
prehend why a developer should not be able to agree to contribute the
total cost of infrastructure provision, even if it goes beyond that attribut-
able solely to his development, if he can thereby ensure that develop-
ment will commence promptly, rather than still having to wait for the
public agency to allocate its share of the capital. It is also puzzling to see
the Court of Appeal elevate policy statements by a government depart-
ment to the status of rules of law, without offering any separate indepen-
dent analysis of the legal principles involved.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the dictum, in practice, is widely
ignored or simply not understood. Yet an attempt by counsel in R. v.
Westminster City Council, ex parte Monahan'°' to have it reviewed was
unsuccessful. Kerr, L.J., said (although again his comments were
purely obiter):
Mr. Boydell [Counsel for the Opera House] submitted that the powers of a planning
authority under [a section 106 agreement] were wider than under section [70(1)] and
that the contrary view expressed by Lloyd L.J. in an obiter passage in Bradford was
99. For the somewhat obscure basis for this rule, see M. GRANT, URBAN PLANNING
LAW 343-45 (1982). The traditional approach is, however, upset by two recent devel-
opments: (1) the Court of Appeal's ruling in R. v. Richmond upon Thames Borough
Council, exparte McCarthy & Stone (Developments) Ltd., [1990] 2 P.L.R. 109, to the
effect that a local authority may be generally entitled to make charges for things that it
does (as opposed to imposing taxes) by virtue of its power under the LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT ACT 1972, § 111, to do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive
or incidental to, the discharge of any of their functions (though this may now have to
yield to a more restrictive approach taken by the House of Lords on that provision in
Hazell v. London Borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (Jan. 24, 1991)); and (2) by
the LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HOUSING ACT 1989 creating a specific statutory charging
power, which could by regulations be adapted to infrastructure charges.
100. [1986] J.P.L. 598; (1986) 53 P. & C.R. 55.
101. [1989] J.P.L. 107; [1989] 1 P.L.R. 36.
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incorrect and should not be followed. While it is equally unnecessary to express any
concluded view on this question in the present case, I would certainly not accept that
submission as a general proposition. [Section 106] agreements undoubtedly facilitate
the formulation of qualified planning permissions in comparison with the imposition of
express conditions, and no doubt they also simplify the procedural aspects of the plan-
ning process in many ways. They have the advantages of the flexibility of a negotiable
agreement in contrast to a process of unilateral imposition; and they are therefore no
doubt far less vulnerable to the risk of successful appeals or applications for judicial
review, which is to be welcomed. But if a particular condition would be illegal-on the
ground of manifest unreasonableness or otherwise-if it were imposed on an applicant
for planning permission, then it cannot acquire validity if it is embodied in a [section
106] agreement, whether at the instance of the applicant himself or not.' 0
But the High Court on two occasions now has taken a different approach.
In R. v. Gillingham Borough Council, ex parte F. Parham Ltd.,'°3 the
Court interpreted the "manifestly unreasonableness" test as procedural
rather than substantive. Thus, Roch, J., observed that a section 106
agreement "must be such as a reasonable planning authority, duly appre-
ciating its statutory duties, could have properly imposed [sic] ....
And in R. v. Wealden District Council, ex parte Charles Church
South East Ltd.,'° the Court, citing that decision (including its reference
to Bradford) but not referring at all to the more recent Westminster'°6
case, agreed with that approach and observed that "it is otherwise diffi-
cult to see what the purpose of section 106 is, if the powers under it are
no greater than the powers to impose conditions.'
0 7
Perhaps the most appropriate approach to section 106 agreements is
to recognise, as the United States courts have done with development
agreements, that they are fundamentally contractual in nature, and that,
although the procedure adopted by an authority in negotiating an agree-
ment may be subject to challenge through judicial review, the substan-
tive validity of the agreement should be determined applying contrac-
tual principles. In attempting to artificially reduce the scope of section
106 so as to restrain the power of authorities to impose exactions, the
courts have misdirected their attention to the wrong phase of the plan-
ning process. The question should be whether the decision to grant plan-
102. Id.
103. [1988] J.P.L. 336; [1988] 1 P.L.R. 7.
104. Id.
105. [1989] 59 P. & C.R. 150; [1989] J.P.L. 837.
106. Id.
107. The agreement which the court upheld made provision for the developer financ-
ing the construction of a traffic gyratory system (known as a "roundabout") at an exist-
ing highway junction, the construction of foul and surface water drainage and the laying
out and donation of a play area and an open space woodland area. Id. The applicants,
who proposed to develop adjoining land, complained that the burden was too low and
meant that they would be forced to accept a heavier infrastructure burden under a sec-
tion 106 agreement on their own land. Id.
ning permission, on an application which is related to a section 106
agreement, is based solely upon material considerations. To the extent
that it follows from an unrelated inducement by the developer, whether
or not recorded in a section 106 agreement, it is open to challenge. An
appropriate test would be the Nollan test of rational nexus, not only be-
cause it embodies what a "material" consideration should entail, but
also because it concentrates on the substance of the relationship rather
than on the form of the transaction (land, money or facility) or the legal
instrument used to record it.
XH. Conclusions
It is dangerous to draw precise conclusions from a limited comparative
analysis such as this. The issues raised by the phenomenon of devel-
opers' contributions to public costs are complex, and market conditions
and planning controls vary considerably within and between Britain and
the United States. The courts in both countries have come to accept that
it is appropriate for local governments to look to developers for contri-
butions to providing public services, but have been anxious to establish
limits so as to ensure that powers conferred to regulate land develop-
ment are not misused. The necessity to avoid falling foul of the "tak-
ing" doctrine has meant that United States local governments have al-
ways had to be in a position to justify their rules in case of constitutional
challenge, and hence to pursue openness and economic transparency,
while their British counterparts, faced with inadequate and conflicting
guidance, have taken what advantage they could of economic expedi-
ence under conditions of secrecy. It is also fair to observe that under the
current state of the law in each country, the development agreement is
more useful to local government in the United States for the relatively
(legally) unrestricted negotiation for public facilities and amenities to be
provided by the landowner, than it is to the local government counter-
part in the United Kingdom. If the United States local government must
take care to avoid a "takings" challenge in the first instance of exac-
tions and impact fees, these issues are more or less resolved through a
development agreement. A United Kingdom local government, on the
other hand, may theoretically have a freer hand in applying conditions
for necessary infrastructure, but the United Kingdom version of the de-
velopment agreement has become unnecessarily restricted by the law
applying to planning conditions.
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